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POLIGAME 
Section I: The Exercise and Its Objecti~es 
POLIGAME is an exercise which allows participants to learn about the Federal 
policy making process by participating in a si.imlatecf version of this process. 
The POLIGAME exercise approximates the process of resolving conflicts among 
various interests groups in the process of formulating public policy as it affects 
agriculture and agricultural industries. 
Participants learn about these processes of conflict resolution and policy 
formulation by advancing the positions held by numerous groups of actors in the 
Federal policy process. These include career civil servants, congressmen, White 
House executives, and representatives of various organized interest groups. At 
the outset, no single group or individual has sufficient power to impose his or 
her objectives on the rest of the participants. The objectives held by different 
persons are not always compatible. Through logical arguments and political 
bargaining, participants attempt to win support for their positions. The exercise 
ends with participants developing and submitting one or more legislative proposals, 
each supported by a block of participant votes. 
POLIGAME is designed to help you understand the organization and the operation 
of the Federal government as it relates to the formulation of public policy. It 
will assist you in understanding the role of politics in resolving conflicts within 
the process of policy formulation, the limits of rational decision making, the tensions 
between various interest groups and governmental agencies over the control of 
public policy, and help sharpen your skills in analyzing the consequences of 
alternative public policies relative to achieving specified and often conflicting 
goals. 
Section II: Groups and Persons Represented 
Following is a list of the persons who will.be represented by the participants 
in POLIGAME, along with a general description of the nature of the group with 
which they sit. At the outset of the game, the instructor will distribute to 
each group the specific objective for which it is expected to fight. Because of 
the make-up of the groups it is not unlikely that some of the participants may 
break with their group in the process of achieving their objective. 
Group I - The U.S. Department of Agriculture 
Traditionally, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has been a "clientele" 
department, serving the needs of farmers and others in the agricultural community. 
It's methods for enlisting the support of its clientele in the formulation and 
execution of policy - methods such as the use of farmer elected advisory committees -
have been copied widely by other Federal agencies serving specified clientele groups. 
In recent years, as the farm population has declined in relative political 
importance, the USDA has expanded into new programs with new clientele - low income 
adults, school children, hungry Asians, Chinese and Russians, rural homeowners, 
businessmen in small towns, and consumer groups in general. Despite these new 
clientele, however, the USDA still retains its character as a "department of farmers." 
l 
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Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Vacant) 
/Undersecretary for International Affairs (Ac_ying Secretary) / 
NAssistant Secretary for Consumer Services ~ / 
Assistant Secretary for Marketing Services .../" 
// Administrator, Farmer Cooperative Service~ 
I Administrator, Economic Analysis Division\/' 
Administrator, ~ting Orders Division V""' f,A.CJ.. .... L ~-r;;/z..c>-:..- _._c.,; ,-"'~·---:-
General Counsel i:. .... ,.,......._...,.._-T)~ ,_,,..._,,~<.s_,..r, -\ -,..;~ .,__--r,_..:__-..,..J._~,.-:-~. 
- . \ . 1) r 
"-\)""\''. :- \'--"-'-=-~ "-'~'-'"-'~ r""'=:_''"~ = ,~~.:;., 
~A' •;J..,,/lo \.:--~'--':;.;.-- ·:,/·~~J.~-"-'·H"""i (:'!"'.... .fl) ..i..,.._"· \ ~,...._....,_, 
Groups II - Traditional Agricultural Clientele '~~- .,J..,.__~\ -'\ ·~"'-"''"""" '\'\< ,'L'-'-•>>--~'~._...,.~\\.., 
~\ ......... ~ I 
The traditional clientele of the U.S. Department of Agriculture are organized 
in many different ways - in broad scale groups such as the American Farm Bureau 
Federal, or in specific organizations representing a certain groups of producers 
such as the National Milk Producers Federation. Sometimes the objective~ 
broad scale farm groups conflict with the interests of the specific _ _--,....-ouprs. All 
of these organizations are well financed and have lobbyists who f-:;-~- experienced 
at influencing governmental policy. These organizations view the USDA as "their 
department" and are generally opposed to any policy er_.:.-~.,-:..-;:...;., ~would reduce 
their influence over agricultural affai:r::;. ·:1.1'geurnl, they want farm prices to 
stay ahead of production costs and are committed to whatever government policies 
are necessary in order to accomplish this. 
. \.-.."\' _v' .. 
~~ 
Representative, 
Representative, 
Representative, 
/ 
National Grain and Feed Association l.'/ 
National Milk Producers Federation L/ 
\ 7 ~!_.; r ~c--'r -_ . 
.._, ~ ]\ \):.>-'" '-
fil Representative, 
Representative, 
/Representative, 
Representative, 
American Agricultural Movement \/ 
American Farm Bureau Fed7I"ation ~,..-/' 
National Farmers Union V' 
National Catt7emens As~ociatjon / 
U.S. Feed Grains Council i;/ 
Group III - New Agricultural Clientele 
,'' ._.;,···:·-~· _).1~q, ..... ..r..-( ~ .J.. ;,:r" 
~ _, ........ - ' ~ t"' ·j \ 
J \ ~\ .-(si"'t .,.- ...,.. ~"''Y.:,...._ ... v) 
"\ • \..J"" I ~ ....,.:-'- _\.r 
-.r- --\ . l ,.r' • ./ 9 
\ " ::, ... " ~v_I , ( /.~ . / \ · .
.....,,..-- .. ·-: t 
.;'-' .. ·' _ .• · I {-' ./ 1._,..r'{ ,,t, 
' V' ..._ .... , ... ~c..c· ,\ ~- Ji: ,X -1 
' ' I )~ I('./ ,.J' 
' . J ' . ~ r "-<. ,J A number of factors in recent years have broadened the clientele of the ..r·· .... / 
Department of Agriculture, making it much less of a "department of farmers." 1 . ,. ~r . 
Responsibility for the administration of Federal food programs has increased the ~;;:;/ 
role of the department as a social welfare agency. The political impact of food y ,~ 
as an economic resource in a hungry world has given the department increased ' 
international responsibilities. The impact of food prices on inflation has given 
the department a prominent role in macroeconomic policy. Expansion of the 
department's rural development programs have placed it in competition with the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Environmental Protection 
Agency. Its role in protecting food safety and quality have caused many persons 
to look to the department for nutritional leadership. With these changes have 
come new clientele who want to influence USDA policy in different ways. 
• • 
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Representative, Consumers Feder~ion of America ~ 
Representative, Common Cause L./" . 
Representative, Consumers Union of the United States ~ ;.: 
;ti Representative, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization V /,/' 
;/I Lobbyist for the developing nations that purchase grain and rice from v\r ' c·-
the United States / . ) J ... ,~ ... ':,.. 
j/ Investigative Reporter, Washington Post / . ~'('. i ,/ \ V j'"":/\~ '"""=·c' ~~~~~~e:~a~~:e~e~~~!-!~~i:~S~F!~~O~:~a~!!~~~' p~~~ e~~o~i t" r~~_/J"J. ·~ 
·\ 1"'' / :;,'f-"'. ' 
, / ... 
. r-~ 
\ Group IV - The National Antitrust Lobby 
There is an informal coalition of people who are interested in more effective 
and expedient enforcement of antitrust policy in the United States. This group 
has been concerned with two basic problems: The long period of time required, 
or outright inability of government to successfully pursue antitrust litigation 
against the giant corporations in the U.S., and the exemptions provided in law 
from the general provisions of the antitrust statutes for certain groups. In 
particular, they have expressed continual opposition to what they perceive to be 
exemptions for agricultural producers and other farm related organizations, 
particularly farm cooperatives and market orders. In an interesting paradox, 
this group has shown relatively little concern for the antitrust exemptions enjoyed., .:. .. 
by organized labor. . - ~·¥- .., .... '\ 
0 ;(..-' • ..,~ ..Y' 
·'' ~.... .;(l • >-" \ 
Attorney General of the United States ".,{-..., ..... - (,.r' ~~1»,.,.' ... : 
Assistant Attorney General, Anti-Trust ynforcement ~ ; /.V-r- ~..r\..T~:. ,.,• 
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission V sJ~\:J.\ . :5'"' .. ~.---
// Director, Competition Division, FTC V' / r" ,,.:s~(r,,~~. 11_.1 "1'~ ... 
I Chairman, Council on Wage and Price Stability £,;"'"" ~~ r;-v> .;::.~ ~ 
Chairman, National Commission For Review of Antitrust laws and Procedures l \j...-.Y 
(U.S. Senator, Democrat, Ohio, Chairman of the Senatejudi~iary . · .1 1 ) 
Subcommittee on Anti-Trust Policy and Procedure) V (!~- f.A<-ItlJ..d °"-:J 
Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committ~'e ~· 
(Democrat, New Jersey) 
Group V - The Food Industry Lobby 
The large food manufacturing, processing and retailing corporations present 
a strong but independent voice in the Federal policy development process. In 
general, this group opposes government intervention and regulation in the food 
industry, resists policies which enhance prices for farm products, and generally 
aligns with other industrial interests in the country. However, close cooperation 
or coordination among the various participants in this group is seldom observable 
except when the food industry or industrial sector at large is threatened by massive ' ~ 
government regulation. ~ 
~ p( 
_.'f Chairman, General Food Corporation '/. A , . ; 
/}President, Kellogs of Battle Creek V / .,,.. c/ 1 hl' • .y· 1_ 
I General Council, Associated Milk Producers, Inc.v / · _, ry v """ (["' ·"\ /Executive Director, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives ~ J 
I Executive Vice. Preside~t, Hunt and Wesson Foods V -:::}~~~ .. -; .. /)..; \,.t~ / 
/Director, Public Relations, Iowa Beef Processors. Inc .,,,_::}./' .r ..f'"' .• ···~-/ 
/Executive Director, Food Marketing Institute ~ ")t-·6-'\ · ~~ ~ ,,.,.J 1" (\ ,-•'-: 
/Vice President and Corporate Economist, Borden, Inc. ~:('J-- ... ---".._: ;;:,u· ~-·\ ',;::' .. _., 
~)· L~ ,_.'"" v 1" _ ..... ~ 
-:. "' ..., .. / '·, · ..
~ .. • \ o:--..' I· J. .. '-~ l'i ~"· .... r.r· .. ~·· _( ... ~ ... 
/. (")r.,'\ .. e \ - ... -:. 
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Group VI - Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives 
The committee on Agriculture in the POLIGAME exercise represents the various 
congressional committees which oversee the different programs and policies which 
impact upon the agricultural community. It combines the functions of several 
congressional committees including agriculture, interior, judiciary, commerce 
and consumer affairs (since no money is being appropriated as part of POLIGAME, 
- . 
only the work of substantive committees is relevant and appropriations are excluded). 
In the real world, these different committees function in roughly the same way. 
Each congressman specializes in a particular program or policy area. Rarely 
does one congressman interfer in another's area of specialization. Working together 
is emphasized and partisanship is discouraged. The Chairman generally seeks to 
gain committee consensus before moving ahead on an issue, especially after the 
Democratic Caucus deposed the chairman of a committee who the committee members 
felt was too old and autocratic. Reaportionment has significantly reduced the 
power of the farm block and the committee is now more responsive to consumer 
interests and other nontraditional points of view. It is, none the less, still 
a friend of agriculture in general. 
I Chairman, House Agriculture Committee (Democrat, j.lashington) 
/Ranking Minority Member (Republican, Oklahoma) v' 
/ Ranking Majority Member (Democrat, Georgi.a) ~ · \ 
Majority Member (Democrat, Minnesota) v.(SvT u-....'"''-j 
///Majority Member (Democrat, New York) ~ 
///!Minority Member (Republican, Ohio) V · 
j Chief Staff Economist (Democrat, Former Chief Economist, 
Farmers Union) V 
Group VII - The White House 
The attitude of the President toward agricultural policy, anti-trust policy 
and competitions policy is inseparable from the leadership role he must play in 
international affairs, his need to improve the economy and promote economic 
stability, and his basic commitment to reforms in government policy and program 
performance through reorganization of the Federal bureaucracy. In particular, 
he supports the transformation of the Department of Agriculture into a Department 
of Food and Agriculture and the transfer of many of the responsibilities currently 
held by the Secretary of Agriculture for regulating competitive behavior in the 
agricultural industries to the Department of Justice. 
/~resident of the United States (Democrat)// 
Director, Office of Management and Budget V 
Director, Domestic Council ~ 
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors ~ 
Special Assistant For Consumer Affairs ~ 
Special Assistant For ~retional Relations ~ 
Secretary of State t.,.../ I ~ \t---.~~ 
.T. 
r 
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Section III: The Omnibus Agricultural Antitrust Act of 1979 
Participants in POLIGAME are asked to gather support for an Omnibus Agricultural 
Antitrust Act. You are not asked to formally enact the bill nor are you required 
to appropriate money to pay for its enforcement. Rather, the game is solely 
concerned with gathering sufficient support to assure passage. 
To gather support for passage of the Act, you will have to persuade other 
groups and participants in POLIGAME to accept your objective and proposed policies. 
No single group has the power to dictate a solution on their own terms, not even 
the President of the United States. During the primary of 1952, then President 
Harry S. Truman, would sit at his desk and contemplate the problems that General 
Eisenhower would face if he won the nomination and the election. "He'll sit here.," 
Truman would remark, "And he' 11 say, 'Do this, do that,' and nothing will happen." 
Reflecting upon his seven years as the nation's Chief Executive, Truman would add, 
"I sit here all day trying to persuade people to do the things they ought to have 
sense enough to do without my persuading them. That's all the powers of the 
President amount to." 
Each group in POLIGAME has its own independent base of power - the President 
has his "mandate," the congressmen have the voters in their districts, the 
bureaucrats have their expertise, the lobbyists have the constituents, the 
investigative reporter has his readers and so on. Moreover the American political 
system is set up with its division of powers and checks and balances to prevent 
any one group from dominating the whole of the process. Your success in POLIGAME 
will depend upon your ability to persuade and influence these participants. 
To assure passage of the Omnibus Agricultural Antitrust Act (and your objective 
within it) you must strive to form a coalition consisting of more than a majority 
of participants. The larger the number of participants who support an Act that 
encompasses your objective, the greater the number of points you score in the 
exercise. It is sufficient to say that no possible coalition is precluded. The 
American political system contains plenty strategies for enacting a policy 
provided that sufficient support has been marshalled behind a specific plan. 
Your job is to marshall that support behind a plan or an act that achieves your 
objective. 
Why is an Omnibus Agricultural Antitrust Act necessary? 
At least since the passage of the Capper-Volstead Act in 1922, parts of the 
agricultural community have been treated uniquely under the antitrust laws of 
the United States. The Capper-Volstead Act specifically exempts farmers from the 
provisions from the Sherman Antitrust Act and in general has been interpreted as 
exempting farmer cooperatives from the anti-merger provisions of the Clayton 
Act and perhaps from other antitrust policies. 
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 establishes a mechanism 
for creating marketing orders and agreements for agricultural products which, 
in themselves, are exceptions to antitrust law. Under the marketing orders and 
agreements provisions of law, the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to 
specify certain industry-wide or market-wide behavior for all participants in 
certain agricultural markets, thus putting the Federal government directly in 
the role of establishing and maintaining cartel-type market structure and behavior. 
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Considerable market concentration has occurred in food manufacturing,- . 
processing and retailing and in farm production input manufacturing and distribution 
since World War II. With the exception of certain mergers among dairy processing 
firms that have been blocked by the Justice Department, Federal antitrust policy 
has had relatively little impact on this concentration of economic power in 
the U.S. Food system. 
Foreign trade has become a significant factor in the demand for agricultural 
product~ in the United States and a major factor in U.S. international policies 
of detente and non-military aid to developing nations. Yet, the exports of 
agricultural products are dominated by five very .large multi-national, U.S. 
based firms that account for an estimated 90% of all U.S. agricultural exports. 
Much concern has been expressed by consumer groups, the Council on Wage 
and Price Stability, The Treasury Department and others relative to the impact 
of food prices on family budgets, inflation, and overall economic conditions. 
Accusing fingers are frequently pointed at both large farmer cooperatives and 
large food processing and retailing firms as a source of excess price esculation. 
Both the White House and Congress have undertaken studies to examine the 
implications of antitrust exemptions or ineffective antitrust enforcement in 
the agricultural and food sector. Both have recommended changes in U.S. antitrust 
policy relative to food and agriculture. 
Consumer groups have laid claim to their right to be represented in 
agricultural policy with the establishment of an assistant secretary for consumer 
affairs in the Department of Agriculture. 
Hanging over all of these issues and concerns is the problem of reorganization 
of the Federal government. It is fair to say that the Department of Agriculture 
has been the target for more unrealized reorganization plans than any other major 
Federal agency. Much controversy has been generated over the question of whether 
the Department of Agriculture should be a Department of Farms, a Department of 
Rural Development, a Department of Food, or a Regulatory Agency, or whether its 
current market regulatory activities should be transferred to such agencies as 
the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission. 
To emphasize the issues of reorganization, the POLIGAME exercise begins 
without a Secretary of Agriculture, the last one having resigned for reasons 
of health (something he ate, we suspect). During the game the President may 
appoint any other player to this position. Senate confirmation is assumed 
and the player so appointed brings all of his support and prestige with him. 
Section IV: Rules of the Game 
The ruJesof POLIGAME generally conform to the rules of the American political. 
system although the process has been simplified to expedite the process of the 
exercise and to facilitate a scoring process for individual participants. 
Scoring: As in the real world, the objective of POLIGAME is to get your 
objective incorporated into the version of the Omnibus Agricultural Antitrust 
Act which you support, and to get that Act supported by as many other participants 
as possib'le. The objectives are assigned to each group immediately prior to the 
beginning of the POLIGAME exercise by the instructor. 
• 
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In addition to achieving support for your position, each group much prepare 
a strategy for winning support for its objective. At the outset of the game, 
each group must rank the other six groups beginning with the group whose support 
you will spend the most time pursuing and ending with the group whose support you 
do not expect to get. 'Th.e first, second and sixth names on this list are submitted 
to the instructor at the end of the first POLIGAME session. The first and second 
named groups will be considered those whose support you are expecting to enlist 
on your behalf and the sixth group is considered from be the one from which you 
will have little, if any, support. 
A maximum of 36 points can be earned by participants in POLIGAME. A maximum 
of 18 of these 36 points can be earned by individual action and the remaining 
18 points are earned through group action in the exercise. 
Individual points are earned as follows: 
a. 9 points if your individual power voucher is attached to a 
draft of the Omnibus Agricultural Antitrust Act which incorporates 
policies that will achieve the objective assigned to your group, and; 
b. 3 points are earned for having your power voucher attached to a 
draft Act that is supported by not less than 30% or more than 39% 
of the total number of power vouchers outstanding, or; 
c. 6 points are earned for having your individual power voucher 
attached to a draft Act which has not less than 40% or more than 
49% of the total number of outstanding power vouchers attached, or; 
d. 9 points are earned for having your individual voucher attached 
to a draft Act which has the support of 50% or more of the outstanding 
power vouchers. 
Group points are earned as follows: 
a. each member of a group earns 9 points if a majority of the outstanding 
power vouchers from that group are attached to a draft Act which is 
supported by 60~ or more of the total number of vouchers outstanding 
among all participants. That is, you must gather enough support for 
your plan to propel it past the various obstacles lurking in the 
American political system. Therefore, a simpJe majority of the 
power vouchers will not be sufficient. You must collect more than 
a majority to assure passage of your proposal. An extraordinary 
majority assures you that the potential opponents of the plan (even 
the President) will not be able to veto or hamstring the bill. You're 
only concerned with gathering the necessary support. A smaller number 
of points can be earned if a majority of your group supports a 
legislative proposal which is supported by less than 60% of all 
participants; 
b. 6 points will be earned if between 45% and 60% of the total participants 
support your group's proposal, and; 
c. 3 points if between 30% and 45% of the total participants support 
your proposal; 
d. each group will earn 3 points for forming coalitions with each of 
the two groups identified in your first strategy session and an 
additional 3 points for not forming a coalition with the group whose 
support you least expected to receive. A coalition is defined as the 
attachedment of a simple majority of the power vouchers from members 
of another group to the same draft Act that includes support by simple 
majority of the ~embers from your group. 
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Power: Power in the POLIGAME exercise is represented by a white ballot 
known as a "power voucher." At the outset of the game, each participant will 
receive a power voucher. These belong to the individual and not to the group. 
Participants register their support for a legislative plan or proposed Act by 
attaching their power voucher to it. Participants may also sign their power 
vouchers over to another individual who will represent them in final deliberations. 
To do this, the power voucher must be endorsed as one would sign over a check. 
Once the power voucher is attached to a plan or draft Act, or signed over 
to another individual, it cannot be retrieved. Because of this, it is expected 
that participants will be reluctant to part with their power vouchers until the 
very end of the game. To facilitate progress, each participant is also provided 
a colored ballot, the "power pledge", which allows him to pledge support to a 
plan or to an individual without surrendering his power voucher. Conditions 
may be attached to the power pledge. If the person or group holding the pledge 
violates these conditions, the participant may refuse to surrender his power 
voucher. 
Participants should remember that their primary mission is to get their 
objective or positions adopted in a draft legislative Act that has majority 
support attached to it. This does not mean that the primary mission is to 
collect power vouchers. Technically, it does not matter who gathers the power 
vouchers so long as your position is contained in the draft Act that has your 
power voucher attached to it. 
Number of power vouchers outstanding: 
Section V: Schedule of Events 
During the POLIGAME exercise, participants will hold strategy sessions with 
their own group, caucus with their allies, participate in formal hearings, engage 
in informal negotiations and may be asked to send representatives to conference 
negotiations requested by other groups. In the real world, these procedures 
would consume from 6 to 18 months of bureaucratic and legislative activity. The 
POLIGAME exercise is geared to be completed in about 10 hours with participants 
adhering to the following schedule of events: 
1. First Caucus: (2 hours) Each of the seven groups caucuses by 
itself. No group may meet with any other until the initial caucuses by 
each group have occurred. During this caucus, each group will receive 
their objective to be sought in the final legislative Act and each 
group will rank the other groups in regard to forming or not forming 
coalitions. During this first causus, each group should do the following: 
A. Discuss the objective given to it by the POLIGAME instructor, 
B. Formulate a rough outline of the policies which could be incorporated 
into the legislative Act to achieve this objective, 
C. Plan a strategy for winning support of other participants for 
policies which will achieve your objective, 
D. Groups that will be conducting hearings must decide the basic 
strategy to be pursued in the hearing, who to call as outside 
expert witnesses and what line of questioning_ will be purused by 
each member of the group in the process of the hearing, 
E. Groups who will not be holding a hearing must decide who will 
represent the group at each scheduled hearing, what testimony 
will be offered initially in each of the hearings, and outline the 
major lines of analysis and policy positions that will be forwarded 
in the process of responding to questions directed at your 
____ ,.,. ... __ .,._.,.4,..,,.., _a ... .;.,: __ •L- '-----~--- ·-·· 
• 
• 
... 
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2. Formal Hearing: (1.5 hours) The first formal hearing will take 
place in the U.S. House of Representatives (Committee on Agriculture). The 
chairman of this hearing will be the Chairman, House Agriculture Committee. 
The chairman will be expected to make a preliminary statement as to the 
purpose of the hearing and can make a policy position statement, at his 
discretion. Following the chairman's opening statement he can question one 
witness or call for prepared testimony from one person on his committee. 
Following the first testimony, the ranking minority member of the House 
Agriculture Committee must be given the opportunity to make a prepared 
statement and to question one invited witness or call upon another member 
of the committee to make a prepared statement. Following that, questions 
can be directed by anyone on the committee to any witness and any committee 
member may make a policy statement. At least one witness must be called from 
each of the six other groups. No prepared statement may exceed five minutes. 
It is up to the chairman of the committee to select the order in which members 
of the committee have the floor, either for presenting statements or questioning 
witnesses. However, he must assure that in the duration of the hearing, each 
member of the committee has at least one opportunity to speak or to question 
witnesses. Remember, the purpose of the hearing is to help participants search 
for common areas of agreement. Make your positions known but do not reveal 
too much. 
3. Stragety Session: (30 minutes) Following thP first formal hearing, 
a period will be provided for each group to caucus and revise their strategies 
and plans based upon the outcome and testimonies offered in the first hearing. 
4. Formal Hearing: (1.5 hours) The second formal hearing will take 
place in the Department of Agriculture. This hearing will be chaired by 
the Secretary of Agriculture, or in the case of vacancy, the Acting Secretary. 
The rules of procedure are identical to those for the first formal hearing, 
however, the Chairman can delegate to another member of the group responsi-
bility for making the opening statement, and there is no one in the group 
that has a unique right to make the second or minority statement. 
5. Strategy Session: (30 minutes) Following the second formal 
hearing, a strategy session will be provided for each group to caucus and 
again revise their strategies and plans based upon the outcome of the 
second hearing. 
6. Formal Hearing: (1.5 hours) The third formal hearing will take 
place in the White House. It will be chaired by the President. The 
rules of procedure are identical to those for the second hearing. 
7. Strategy Session: (30 minutes) At the end of the third formal 
hearing, time will be provided for each group to caucus in a final strategy 
session. 
8. Final Caucus: (2 hours) last session in the POLIGAME exercise is 
set aside for finalizing the draft legislative Act, soliciting support, and 
transmitting that plan to the POLIGAME instructor. The specific steps 
that should be considered in the final caucus include the following: 
A. Strategy Session - Each group should caucus and decide if it 
wants to join forces with other groups in drafting a proposed 
Act, or to draft a plan independently and then secure power 
vouchers from other participants. 
B. 
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Drafting the Plari - At this point the groups who have found allies 
must meet and write down on paper their points of agreement and 
disagreement. Groups that are not part of coalitions must procede 
with drafting their own legislative Act. Care must be taken in 
this process that the conditions attached to power pledges which 
have been accumulated in support of a coalition's plan must be 
embodied in the draft Act or the actual power voucher may be 
lost. The major policies in the draft legislative plan should 
be specified on paper at this point and an enumeration of the 
expected number of power vouchers which will support this plan 
should be made. 
C. Conference Negotiations - If, after drafting an Act and counting 
the expected number of power vouchers in support of that Act, 
the group or coalition decides it does not have an adequate 
amount of support for its plan in order to assure passage or at 
least to earn the desired number of points, then conferees should 
be appointed to negotiate with other groups or coalitions. No 
more than two conferees should be appointed from each group or 
coalition that meets for _conference negotiations. The idea is 
to work out a compromise between two or more groups or coalitions 
for joint support for a single Act. This compromise should be 
worked out in front of the other participants by the conferees 
but the other participants are expected to remain silent during 
the conference negotiations. 
D. Submitting the Legislation - Once all negotiations have been 
completed, all coalitions formed, and all agreements have been 
set forth, the final draft of the proposed legislation must be 
set forth on paper. As soon as this plan is set forth on paper 
it is time to attach to it power vouchers from individual 
participants. At the conclusion of this session all power 
vouchers must be attached to some legislat,ive Act and these, in 
turn, must be turned in to the instructor. No power vouchers 
will be accepted unless they are attached to a legislative Act 
and no power vouchers will be accepted after the conclusion of 
this final POLIGAME session. The final legislative plans 
submitted,with the power vouchers attached, can be hand written 
outlines identifying the major policies and procedures included 
in the proposed Act. It is not necessary to spell out in detail 
the rules that you would expect to be adopted in the process of 
implementing your policies and procedures. Rather, the intent is 
to set forth the policies and procedures which are being forwarded 
in order to achieve the desired objectives. 
E. · Supporting Your Act - The POLIGAME instructor will judge the 
extent to which the policies and procedures put forth in each Act 
will achieve the objectives assigned to the various groups of 
participants who support each Act with their power vouchers. 
However, each group or coalition submitting an Act has the option 
of providing a statement with the logic of why you believe these 
policies and procedures will achieve the desired objectives. 
These supporting statements can be submitted to the instructor 
anytime within two days following the submission of the draft Act. 
However, it must be indicated with the submitted Act whether or 
not a supporting document will be provided to the instructor. 
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Note: It is expected that informal negotiations among groups and individual 
participants will occur throughout the duration of the POLIGAME exercise. It is 
through this process of informal negotiations when much of the basis for 
coalitions and agreement in principle will probably be identified. Remember, 
)OU can use your power pledges at any time including informal negotiations to 
pledge your support for a particular policy and you can attach conditions to 
your pledge. However, you should turn over your power voucher to another person, 
to a group, or to a coalition only when you are confident that it will be attached 
to a draft Act that is consistent with your interests. 
